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Abstract 
Policy, media, activist and academic discourses often portray migrants and refugees in 
the extreme, as victims or villains. This portrayal obscures the agency demonstrated 
by migrants and refugees and evidenced in their own accounts of their journeys. It 
also reifies the power of the state to ‘secure’ borders and control migration, and 
conceals the contested politics of mobility and security visible in negotiations 
between migrants, borders guards, smugglers, fishermen, and other actors. In this 
article, I take an ethnographic approach and conceptualises the border from the 
bottom up as a contested site of negotiation. The analysis reveals the ways in which 
migrants negotiate with their smugglers, amongst themselves, and with borders 
guards in order to circumvent state controls when entering the state clandestinely. In 
doing so, it questions traditional conceptualizations of sovereignty, security and 
citizenship. The article then analyses how migrants continue to demonstrate agency 
after arrival within state territories, and how this agency can have an impact not only 
an micro, everyday encounters, but also on the macro level: my research demonstrates 
how migrant agency can have causal and constitutive effects on state relations and 
power. The article draws on participant observation and over 130 interviews I 
conducted with migrants, refugees, fishermen, NGO representations, and 
policymakers between 2007 and 2015 in Malta and Cyprus. 
  
Migrant Agency: Negotiating Borders and Migration Controls 
 
1. Introduction 
The question of migrant agency is central to how academics, policymakers, and 
activists frame and understand international migration. 1  It shapes how academics 
theorize migration, how government officials design policies, and how activists 
devise campaigns to influence policies. The thorny question of agency underlies 
public and policy discourse, where migrants are often characterized in the extreme, 
endowed with either a dangerous agency as unknowable, risky bodies, criminals, and 
potential terrorists; an immoral agency as fraudsters, queue jumpers, and welfare 
scroungers; or no agency at all as refugees, victims of trafficking, and forced migrants 
more broadly (cf. Nyers 2003; Anderson 2008a). These depictions are also gendered. 
It is the voiceless, female refugee who has become the poster child of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other advocacy 
organizations (Johnson 2011), while the spectre of a male migrant haunts the borders 
of the first world. The constitution of migrant agency in this polarized manner 
amplifies the refrain for ‘managed’ migration and has far-reaching consequences. For 
instance, most developed nations have adopted externalisation practices and deterrent 
non-entrée policies, explicitly indicating their preference to resettle (limited) refugees 
from areas of conflict rather than accept those who demonstrate agency by arriving 
‘spontaneously’ at their borders (Mountz 2010).  
 
The question of agency also remains pertinent to policies, lived experiences, and 
rights once migrants cross borders. For example, any evidence of agency during a 
clandestine journey can undermine an asylum seeker’s ‘victimhood’ and thus her 
claim to refugee status (e.g. Oxford 2005: 31-33). Migrants must perform as the 
depoliticized suffering subject incapable of action and necessitating rescue. Those 
who do not conform and demonstrate agency, especially those who thwart state 
controls in order to enter a country, are likely to be securitised and depicted as villains 
who undermine a nation’s security, labour markets, and identity. As such, the victim-
villain binary aids in the construction of the ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ migrant (cf. 
Anderson 2008a).  
 
These binaries reverberate within migrant advocacy work, as well-intentioned 
organizations campaign for the rights of particular migrants by reinforcing their 
construction as victims without agency (cf. Johnson 2011; Sharma 2005). In 
underscoring the refugee as a humanitarian subject or the domestic worker as an 
exploited subject, they inadvertently encourage the racialized construction of and 
division between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ migrants, as well as between insiders and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I use the term ‘migrant’ broadly to include refugees and labour migrants, with a primary focus on 
those who cross the Mediterranean without state authorization or who lose their status once in southern 
Europe. These labels and categories are not unproblematic, being necessarily simplistic, unable to 
capture the complexity of the lives they try to contain, and laden with race and class biases (Anderson 
& Blinder 2014).  
outsiders. Thus while women and children are often pointed to as undeserving of 
detention and deportation, the ‘foreign national prisoner’ in the UK and the migrant 
issued a ‘security certificate’ in Canada are not generally afforded this humanitarian 
lens (Griffiths 2015; Bosworth 2011).  
 
Even when constructed as victims, migrants are not seen as victims of the state and its 
border policies nor of global capitalist labour markets nor of colonial histories of 
empire, but rather victims of other villainous forces, generally personified as an 
exploitative and cruel trafficker or smuggler. Migrants are also only portrayed as 
victims within limited physical and temporal spaces. In the Mediterranean, migrants 
are rendered victims at sea, during rescues, and in death, where they can be pitied, 
rescued, and mourned as ‘good’ migrants. However, once ashore on EU territory, they 
quickly become risky, securitized bodies, possible villains, who must be detained. In 
this manner, in both policy and advocacy efforts, these binaries depoliticize and in 
doing so narrow the scope of ‘appropriate’ policy responses to a selective 
humanitarian or security framework (cf. Sharma 2005) and contribute to the related 
humanitarian and security spectacles produced at the border (Andersson 2014).  
 
Beyond policy and advocacy circles, divergent assessments of migrant agency within 
migration theories support different ontological assumptions that are often 
underestimated (e.g. Massey et al 1998; cf. Bakewell 2010). For instance, rational 
choice models that valorise agency underpin neoclassical and new economics of 
labour migration theories (e.g. Lee 1966), while world-systems theory prioritizes the 
structural conditions that result in migration apart from any individual decision (e.g. 
Wallerstein 1974; 1979). More recently, migration network theories have indicated 
how networks of friends, relatives, or co-nationals enjoy social capital that facilitate 
continued migration between two places, independent of the initial drivers of 
migration. Network theories often present migration systems as fully-formed without 
investigating the agency required to initiate, transform, or weaken such systems (cf. 
Bakewell et al 2011; Bakewell 2010). The simplistic division in migration studies 
between forced and voluntary migration reinforces such divergent approaches to 
agency.   
 
In this article, I focus on migration across the Mediterranean and posit that the 
prevalent construction of migrants as victims or villains obscures the agency, however 
limited, demonstrated by migrants and refugees and evidenced in their own accounts 
of border crossings and experiences within host states. Ignoring this agency reifies the 
power of the state to ‘secure’ borders and control migration, and conceals the 
contested politics of mobility and security evident in negotiations between migrants, 
borders guards, smugglers, fishermen, and other actors. These encounters illustrate 
alternative modes of seeking security that move beyond the state and citizenship as 
the sole frameworks for security (cf. Innes 2014). Moreover, I also argue that 
migrants are agents of and within international relations as they have an impact not 
only on micro, everyday encounters, but also on the macro level, having indirect, 
direct, and epistemic effects on state policies and state relations. This article thus 
endorses a more nuanced picture of the border as a contested space, questioning 
traditional conceptualizations of sovereignty, security and citizenship.  
 
I examine these issues by drawing upon my research in the Mediterranean region, and 
in particular fieldwork I conducted with migrants, refugees, fishermen, NGO 
representatives, and policymakers in Malta and Cyprus2 between 2007 and 2015. This 
fieldwork included over 130 interviews, 3  as well as participant observation. One 
might suppose that migrants who reach the EU are ‘successful’ in relation to 
counterparts who are thwarted in their journeys by a lack of capital, border policing, 
violence, or death, and thus that the current study involves selection bias in including 
migrants with more agency. While acknowledging the inherent selection bias in any 
qualitative study, I would argue that this position develops from erroneous 
assumptions about migrant journeys as linear trajectories from country of origin to 
destination, as well as about the agency of migrants as measurable characteristic of an 
individual. Rather, journeys are much more fluid, with ‘transit’ countries becoming 
destinations and vice versa as new barriers and opportunities arise (cf. Mainwaring 
and Brigden 2016, forthcoming). This study analyses the ways in which migrants 
negotiate agency in the Mediterranean region at particular moments of their journey. 
For many, this is not the end of their journey: some continue on to other EU countries, 
while others are deported from EU member states to transit states or countries of 
origin.  
 
Heeding the call of feminists such as Dorothy Smith (1987) and others who contend 
that we must begin an analysis of power from people’s everyday lived experiences, I 
foreground the experiences of people moving across the Mediterranean without state 
authorization. The article proceeds with a theoretical discussion of agency, and how it 
has been treated within migration studies. It then turns to examine how migrants find 
room for manoeuvre to negotiate security and sovereignty when crossing borders and 
within states. Lastly, I analyse how such micro demonstrations of agency relate to the 
macro level, by analysing the causal and constitutive effects of migrant agency on 
state relations and power. The analysis reveals an iterative dynamic between a 
contestation of the politics of mobility and their re-appropriation by the state. 
 
2. Negotiating Agency: Beyond Choice and the Neoliberal Subject 
There is a limited and fragmented literature on migrant agency that spans across 
different disciplines, as well as across issue-area studies, such as citizenship and 
transnationalism. Scholars have explored how migrants challenge traditional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Cyprus remains a divided country. I conducted the majority of my research in the Republic of Cyprus, 
geographically the southern part of the island. A more limited number of interviews were conducted in 
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, a state unrecognized in the international community.  
3 All interviews were conducted in English. Although this precluded a small number of migrants from 
participating in the study, I nevertheless interviewed male and female migrants with different 
nationalities in rough proportion to estimates of unauthorized arrivals in Malta and Cyprus at the time.  
conceptualizations of citizenship and imply new modes of political belonging 
(McNevin 2009; Nyers 2003), and how irregular migration flows challenge traditional 
representations of sovereignty and borders (Squire 2011). Much of this scholarship 
does not employ the concept of agency per se, instead speaking of contestation, 
autonomous migration, or resistance, for example. Collectively, however, these 
interventions can be understood as addressing the issue of migrant agency and can be 
divided into two different approaches. The most common approach considers specific 
instances of resistance or transgression on the part of migrants, especially those 
without status (e.g. Nyers 2003; 2006). A less common approach examines everyday 
forms of agency, such as how migrants without legal status adapt daily routines and 
social interactions in the face of their deportability (e.g. Sigona 2012). Reflecting 
migration studies more broadly, most of this literature examines migrant agency after 
arrival in a destination country, rather than during the migration journey.4 
 
In contrast to this literature above and building on the literature that has critiqued anti-
trafficking measures for devaluing women’s agency (e.g. Anderson 2008b; 
Andrijasevic 2010; Sharma 2005), this analysis puts migrant agency at its centre and 
examines it in in-between spaces that might be considered hard cases: within 
borderzones where sovereign power is thought to create a state of exception leaving 
only ‘bare life’ and very little room for agency (Agamben 1998; cf. Mountz 2011). 
Although the analysis prioritizes agency, I do not wish to discount the significant 
challenges, structural constraints, and barriers to mobility, rights, and equality that 
migrants travelling in an unauthorized manner face. I do not wish to suggest that 
structural inequalities do not significantly condition their choices. One need not be a 
discerning scholar to see that access to mobility, asylum, and rights are increasingly 
out of reach for most of the world’s population. Neither do I find it necessary to 
reduce agency to choice. As other feminist scholars have argued, adopting a 
neoliberal framework of a unified, rational actor faced with choices in this context is 
problematic and ignores how ‘power works in and through subjects, not in terms of 
crude manipulation, but by structuring our sense of self, by constructing particular 
kinds of subjectivity’ (Gill 2007: 76). Indeed, Bridget Anderson and Martin Ruhs 
(2010: 178) remind us that migrant agency is not simply about ‘choice’ as is often 
portrayed in policy debates, but rather about ‘understanding decision making, the 
room for manoeuvre, opportunity structures and migration trajectories’ within the 
contexts of modern nation-states and the global capitalist system. The issue at hand is 
thus not about choice or free will, but rather how even on the edges of states and 
societies, faced with formidable levels of marginalization, people continue to resist, 
find room for negotiation, and exploit these narrow margins (cf. Andrijasevic 2010; 
Choi & Holroyd 2007: 491).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 There are nevertheless important exceptions, such as studies on migrant agency during the smuggling 
process (e.g. Van Liempt and Doomernik 2006). For further discussion of migrant journeys and 
agency, see introduction and other contributions to special issue on ‘Clandestine Migrant Journeys’ 
(Mainwaring & Brigden, 2016, forthcoming). 
Following Emirbayer and Mische (1998: 970), I proceed with a definition of agency 
as a ‘temporally embedded engagement by actors of different structural 
environments… which, through the interplay of habit, imagination, and judgment, 
both reproduces and transforms those structures in interactive response to the 
problems posed by changing situations’. This definition emphasises the relational and 
social properties of agency and includes three elements – habit, imagination, and 
judgement – that correspond respectively to an iterative element of agency informed 
by the past, a projective element oriented towards the future, and a practical-
evaluative element that mediates the interaction between past habits and future 
projects within specific temporal contingencies (cf. Sewell 1992: 20; Bakewell 2010). 
As Emirbayer and Mische (1998: 970) contend, ‘By differentiating between the 
different dimension of agency, we can help to account for variability and change in 
actors’ capacities for imaginative and critical intervention in the diverse contexts 
within which they act.’ 
 
The focus on judgement as the central pillar that connects the present to the past and 
future allows us to consider agency in moments where migrants consciously create 
space for manoeuvre within state structures and in negotiation with non-state and state 
actors, such as border guards, smugglers, and other migrants. This practical-
evaluative element of agency draws on past experiences to characterize a situation as 
problematic or unresolved, and involves deliberation with others and/or oneself over 
possible trajectories of action (Emirbayer & Mische 1998: 994-1000). Such a 
conceptualization moves away from theorizing agency as ‘acts of citizenship’ that 
may be made without judgement, acts that ‘can be authored or anonymous, intended 
or accidental, individual or collective’ (Nyers 2010: 130; cf. Isin 2008: 23). Although 
the acts of citizenship literature has produced many important works and insights that 
this study draws on, this conceptual framework reinforces the focus on the 
relationship between migrants and the sovereign; in contrast, I analyse agency more 
generally in micro-level negotiations between state actors and migrants, but also 
between migrants, and between smugglers and migrants. Here, I conduct a grounded, 
ethnographic analysis of the agency used to negotiate mobility, and explore how the 
negotiation between control and contestation are co-constitutive (cf. McNevin 2013).  
 
I thus conceive of this agency as political, as a contestation of mobility and bordering 
regimes. More than ‘ruptures’ or ‘interruptions’, I argue that they have the possibility 
of being transformative to the structures they operate within, and demonstrate this 
empirically. Moreover, revealing how migrants on the edges of states and societies 
negotiate agency in familiar ways challenges the over- and under-representations of 
agency that not only allow for the perpetuation of a ‘myth of difference’ between 
historical refugees flows within Europe and contemporary flows from the Third 
World (Chimni 1998; cf. Johnson 2011), but also between citizens and particular non-
citizens, such as irregular migrants or refugees, and between ‘good’ citizens and ‘bad’ 
or ‘failed’ citizens, figures such as the welfare scrounger, the criminal, and the 
teenage mother (Anderson & Hughes 2015). 
 
Examining questions of agency raises the question of how to delimit it. Do all actions 
constitute agency? Is agency dependent on outcomes? How do we know agency when 
we see it? The aim of this article is not to give definitive answers to these questions, 
but rather to demonstrate that migrants are not the victims or villains often portrayed 
in the media, politics, and scholarship. While the agency of wealthy Westerners is 
often assumed, that of the poor, migrants, slum dwellers, refugees, and minorities is 
habitually discounted (Cumbers et al 2010; Scott 1985). Thus, for the purposes of this 
article, I take a fairly encompassing view of ‘agency’. When, in interviews, people 
reported strategic engagement or negotiation with actors or their environment, I coded 
this as agency and explored how these were ambivalent moments of disempowerment 
and empowerment, as well as the outcomes of that engagement. However, drawing on 
Emirbayer and Mische’s definition of agency above, I reject the idea of particular 
outcomes being a necessary condition for the existence of agency: people’s actions 
may transform or reproduce structures.5 My aim is not to endorse the primacy of 
sovereign power over the lives of migrants, seen for example in the work of Giorgio 
Agamben (1998) and scholars influenced by his work, or the primacy of human 
mobility over state control reflected in the ‘autonomy of migration’ literature. Rather, 
I wish to explore the intersection between migrant agency and sovereign power, 
where contestation and ambivalence prevail (cf. McNevin 2013).  
 
3. Negotiated Passage  
The Mediterranean has become an emblematic site of the global struggle over 
mobility and its deadly consequences. Despite attempts to discursively and materially 
construct ‘Fortress Europe’ through restrictive policies at, within, and beyond the 
European Union’s external borders, people continue to thwart state controls in 
attempts to join family members, find refuge, and secure livelihoods. As controls have 
increased, journeys have become more dangerous: in 2015, over 3,700 people died 
making the voyage across the Mediterranean, making up 70 per cent of migrant 
deaths worldwide (IOM 2016). Malta and Cyprus have found themselves embroiled 
in this context since they joined the EU in 2004, shortly after experiencing an increase 
in unauthorized migrant arrivals and related asylum claims around 2002. In Malta, the 
higher levels of immigration were attributed in part to the increase in border patrols 
on Spain’s southern border, around the Canary Islands, and along the West African 
coastline. Faced with these new barriers, migrants began travelling in larger numbers 
through central Africa to Libya and across the Central Mediterranean (Lutterbeck 
2006). Over the last decade, sub-Saharan Africans have constituted the majority of 
these flows: refugees from Somalia and Eritrea have been the largest groups, but West 
Africans also arrive on the island. In recent years, Syrian refugees have become the 
largest group. In Cyprus, the flows are more diverse and include people from Africa, 
the Middle East, and Asia. A labour migration programme established in the early 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 In the final section of the paper, I nevertheless demonstrate how migrant resistance within the state 
can have transformative effects on national and regional policies. 
1990s has contributed to the fact that migrants now make up close to 20 per cent of 
the Cypriot labour force and that a large percentage of migrants without status 
originally arrived on work visas (Eurostat 2015). Those crossing Cypriot borders 
without authorisation, on the other hand, generally arrive in the northern, Turkish-
controlled side of the island before crossing the Green Line, which divides the island, 
into the Republic of Cyprus (Mainwaring 2008).  
 
As member states on the EU’s southern periphery, both countries have portrayed the 
arrival of migrants on their shores as a crisis and adopted migration policies aimed at 
deterrence, in line with wider EU priorities (Mainwaring 2014). However, despite the 
spatial and temporal strategies used by states in order to dissuade migrants and 
refugees from arriving on their territory, migrants negotiate and sometimes overcome 
these barriers. Examining the journey across the Mediterranean reveals instances 
where migrants demonstrate agency despite the difficulties they face. Here I discuss 
how agency is employed in micro-level negotiations that take place: (1) with 
smugglers; (2) between migrants; and (3) with border guards. The focus in this 
section is primarily on negotiations that take place on the high seas, where little 
oversight is possible and where one expects that migrant agency is extremely limited 
and state power blunt. ‘Push back’ policies and reports of boats ‘left to die’ would 
seem to corroborate this bleak picture (Heller et al 2012). I also include in my 
analysis the experiences of land crossings, in particular of the Green Line in Cyprus, 
in order to demonstrate how migrants resist the state of exception constructed within 
different kinds of borderzones.  
  
Before the journey across the Mediterranean, migrants describe negotiations with 
smugglers over the price of passage and the time of departure. Although these 
negotiations are between two unequal actors, migrants leverage kinship, friendship, 
and their own knowledge in order to gain small advantages. Kamara,6 a Liberian man, 
recalled how a friend used his maritime skills in order to negotiate a lower price for 
their passage from Libya across the Mediterranean: ‘I paid $300… [T]hey used to 
collect $1,200, but me I am lucky because my friend he knows how to drive’ 
(Interview, April 2009). Others have less success, and describe attempts to negotiate 
with smugglers as moments of powerlessness: 
Even when we start from Libya, it was broken the seating [in the boat]. 
And we told them, it was broken, we said to the Libyans. [They said,] 
Fuck, move, move, there is no time for me. If somebody saw me from the 
government, they will kill me…. Go, we don’t care about you. And we did. 
We pray to God and we arrived in here (Interview, April 2009). 
Despite the divergent outcomes, migrants in both these examples, faced with 
challenging, dynamic situations, draw on past experiences, skills and networks in 
their negotiations in both these example. This differentiated agency across time and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 All names are pseudonyms. 
space illustrates both the barriers to mobility, violence, and marginalization that 
migrants en route face, but also the room for manoeuvre they find at the margins.  
 
Migrants who arrive in Malta do not tend to negotiate their destination with smugglers 
in Libya, beyond knowing they are buying passage to Europe, 7  although, as is 
demonstrated below, negotiations over rescue and disembarkation occur with coast 
guards and other actors in the Mediterranean. Indeed, if we consider migrant journeys 
more broadly, migrant accounts reflect a dynamic process whereby they respond to 
new information, as well as structural opportunities and challenges along the 
migration route (cf. Havinga and Böcker 1999; Day and White 2002). Their journeys 
are thus rarely the straightforward linear trajectories from country of origin to 
destination, so-often reproduced on maps as arrows menacingly pointing north (cf. 
Mainwaring & Brigden 2016, forthcoming).  
 
William, a Congolese asylum seeker related how he travelled through Uganda, 
Kenya, Syria, and Turkey before arriving in Cyprus. When I asked him whether he 
had a particular destination in mind, he said: 
To be honest, no. No. Because I, I wanted even to apply for asylum in 
Syria, but some people there they said no, you see, the system here is a 
little bit complicated… I mean the UNHCR, they are working there [but] 
the government is not working with them so it’s not good. If you can go a 
little bit further and find a country where there is a system, an asylum 
system, then it might be good for you. So when I reached Turkey, again in 
Istanbul I wanted to apply for asylum. They say, no, you have to go to 
Ankara. The refugees, they are not here in Istanbul, you have to go again 
to Ankara. So I was a little bit confused… So, as I was tired and confused 
by the information, like this, I tried to check myself in the internet. Okay, 
you have to go to Ankara. So, meantime, I had information, that it’s easy 
from Turkey to go to Cyprus. In fact, I saw so many people were coming 
with their visa, with a Turkish visa and they will fly from Istanbul to 
Ercan [Airport in Nicosia]. You see easy. And then the guys we say, okay, 
when you reach the north Cyprus, eh, you just cross to the south and you 
are in Europe. So it’s the easy way! [laughs] And then, I decided to take 
the same route, but I didn’t have the visa and a passport. And how to go 
there? There is one guy then came from Burkina Faso, I don’t know, 
somewhere. West Africa. And the guy he had a visa. He say … he will stay 
in Turkey. He was a football player and there is no need for him to go 
further. He will stay there and look for some football team. If they will 
accept him, they will fix his paper…! He told me, anyway, if you want to 
use my passport, you can go ahead. Because you want to go to Cyprus, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Scholars report this type of negotiation occurring elsewhere (e.g. Van Liempt & Doomernik 2006). In 
Malta, although many migrants report having wanted to go to Italy, others leave Libya without a 
specific destination. Moreover, even those who are trying to reach a particular country recall the 
overwhelming imperative to reach any safe place while at sea.   
you can use this passport. And when you reach there, you send it back to 
me… I was not alone. … I mean so many people use [passports], you 
know? Because we are Africans and the police, immigration, they see 
someone from Africa, so they just look like this, it’s the same person. 
Although the face are not the same! [laughs] (Interview: August 2009). 
 
William’s account reflects a dynamic process whereby he responds to new 
information and opportunities during his journey. Although he is clearly limited in his 
agency due to various structural conditions, he is also not without agency. William’s 
past experiences, his lack of familiarity with asylum systems in Syria and Turkey, and 
his already long journey create incentives for him to apply for asylum in each of these 
countries, but he gathers information from friends, acquaintances and the internet and 
uses it to deliberate over possible trajectories before making a decision. William’s 
account thus reflects the practical-evaluative element of judgement that mediates 
between past experiences and future projects, in his case the desire to settle 
permanently in a country as a refugee. He has preferences and a degree of control 
over his situation. In particular, his successful use of an acquaintance’s passport 
entails agency that is subversive to the state and its borders. His experiences also 
reflect arguments made by Emirbayer and Mische (1998: 1006-07) that ‘[a]ctors who 
face changing situations that demand (or facilitate) the reconstruction of temporal 
perspective can expand their capacity for imaginative and/or deliberative response’ 
and that ‘[a]ctors who are positioned at the intersection of multiple temporal-
relational contexts can develop greater capacities for creative and critical 
intervention’. 
 
In the Central Mediterranean, migrants also negotiate their passage at sea amongst 
themselves and with other actors, such as fishermen and mariners on commercial 
vessels. Migrants negotiate amongst themselves in order to decide who will captain 
the boat, how to distribute very limited food and water, what rules should be followed 
at sea such as whether smoking is permitted, and where to disembark. Disembarkation 
must be negotiated as states have adopted policies that discourage rescue. 8  For 
instance, fishermen and other mariners often refuse to rescue migrants due to 
monetary, security, and legal concerns. Some maintain they provide food, water, and 
directions, while others note that any engagement with these boats and their 
passengers is too risky (Interviews: migrants and refugees; fishermen, 2008-2014).   
 
During negotiations at sea, migrants demonstrate awareness of international rules, 
knowledge they can deploy in order to exert some degree of control over their rescue. 
For instance, one refugee explained how the people he was travelling with were aware 
they needed to reach Maltese or Italian waters in order to be rescued by a European 
country: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In the Central Mediterranean, this was especially case before Italy launched its Mare Nostrum 
operation at the end of 2013.  
We were 24 men and one woman. And when we start our journey from 
Libya, it was on the 15th of October. It was very rough weather. And from 
the minute we left Libya, we were calling for international help to Italy, to 
Malta, to everywhere. But they keep on telling us just that we were on the 
territory of Libya. So we came forward, we came forward. At the end we 
were at the international line. We were in Malta’s territory and then we 
ask for help (Interview: April 2009). 
 
Here, migrant manoeuvres can be understood as an ‘improvisational orientation… 
towards habitual practice which takes place in ongoing dialogue with situational 
contingencies’ (Emirbayer & Mische 1998: 979). Knowledge gained in the past 
shapes migrant expectations that they will be rescued in international waters, 
processes Emirbayer and Mische call ‘recognition of types’ and ‘categorical location’. 
This informs their strategy of calling repeatedly for help while they move through 
Libyan waters.  
 
Contrary to the state narrative that migrants who depart from Libya do not generally 
want to come to Malta,9 most migrants who find themselves in distress at sea maintain 
their priority to be rescued over arriving at a particular intended destination. In 
situations of distress, migrants report that the Armed Forces of Malta (AFM) exert 
pressure on them to continue on to Italy, either through tactics that delay rescue, 
through threats of the long detention period or other difficulties they will face in 
Malta, or through offers of food and petrol to incentivise onward mobility 
(Interviews: 2011; 2015). Thus the most protracted and significant negotiations often 
take place between coastguards and migrants, where despite their limited power, 
migrants exploit their familiarity with international laws that require rescue at sea, and 
their knowledge of national flags and languages in order to identify vessels. Khalid, a 
28-year-old Somali man, described such an encounter: 
… the Maltese rescue team, they arrived. One day before that, there was a 
helicopter taking some photos and I think they called the AFM. They came 
and they talked to us, where do you go you guys? Do you want to call 
Malta or do you want to call Italy? I spoke to them and I said no, we need 
just help from anybody. We don’t need Italy, we don’t need Malta, we just 
need help. And one of them came to our boat… He said if you have a 
problem with the machine, I will fix it and then I will give you some petrol 
and then you can go to Italy. I said we don’t know where Italy is. And he 
said we’ll help you, we’ll help you. How you can help us is to put us on 
your boat [I said]. No, you can just go this way… So, then one of them 
said we’ll give you some time, two hours, then you have to decide if you 
go to Italy or not. And I asked him, what happens if we don’t go to Italy, 
because we don’t know Italy. We just need help. We cannot go with such a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Maltese politicians maintained this position in the interviews I conducted and in the media (e.g. 
Soares & Joy 2014; Gonzi 2011). 
boat. Because inside the boat, we had holes, so the water was coming in. 
And we are worried about it capsizing…. After two hours, they [came] 
back and said, any decision? We say we want to stay here. And then, one 
of us, [a fellow passenger], told me, this guy is from Malta. I said how do 
you know, because I hadn’t seen the flag before. But he said I know the 
flag. And when they came back, I told him [the AFM member] we’re 
going to Malta. And he said, do you know where’s Malta? I say yes. It’s 
not far away from here. And he said, are you going to swim? Because he 
didn’t like to take us. He was pressuring us to take help like food and 
petrol and repair the machine and go on to Italy. I said, no. And after 
when they see we are very serious, they came close and then they 
evacuate people (Interview, April 2011). 
 
Present in this account are the elements of agency discussed above: the 
contextualisation of a social experience in light of past experiences and future 
projects, through deliberation with others and oneself, in order to negotiate possible 
trajectories. Mark Salter (2006) reminds us that specific rules of entry are never 
exhaustive, and some discretion is left with the border guard within the state of 
exception. This discretion is evident in the interaction described above and other 
migrant accounts of negotiations between border guard and migrants in the 
Mediterranean as to whether boats will continue on to Italy or remain in Malta. What 
is also revealed is that this discretion allows space for acts of migrant agency. 
Leveraging their knowledge of international law and state flags, these migrants 
presented themselves to the sovereign as border crossers intending to enter Malta.  
 
Within the Central Mediterranean, the overlapping space between border guard 
discretion and room for migrant agency also indicates the potential for collusion 
between these two actors. Indeed, in some instances the interest of border 
enforcement actors and migrants converge in a desire for migrants to continue on to 
another country (in this case Italy).10 This underscores the complexity of irregular 
border crossings and demonstrates that there is more room for manoeuvre for 
migrants crossing borders than is usually assumed. 
 
Similar negotiations and strategies arise in migrant journeys to Cyprus, and in 
particular their attempts to cross the land border that divides the Cypriot island. 
Despite occasions where migrants are able to exert some control over these 
negotiations, the risks to the individuals on the move remain high, with many 
instances where migrants feel powerless. William, the same Congolese man discussed 
above, explained that with the aid of ‘those who came before [along] the same 
routes’, he was met at Ercan airport in northern Nicosia by facilitators who took him 
to a safe house.  He continued,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 This dynamic has also been evident more recently in the responses by EU member states and their 
border guards to the high numbers of refugees arriving from Syria, Afghanistan and elsewhere since 
2015. 
 And after one day, somebody came – two guys, they say they are police, 
where is our papers, like this. They started intimidating us, until they took 
all our money…. [But] they are just the people in this same business. They 
take my $600, whatever remained in my pocket, they took it away…. Then, 
we stay four days in the north until some other people came so that they 
can cross us (Interview: August 2009). 
 
Further danger awaited William and other migrants as they attempted to cross the 
Green Line dividing Cyprus. Many spoke of injuries they sustained in jumping great 
heights or clambering over barbed wire, as well as violent and racist encounters with 
the police on both sides of the line. William twisted his ankle while jumping over a 
large wall that separated him from ‘Europe’. The Cypriot police apprehended him and 
his three fellow travellers almost immediately, violently denied them the opportunity 
to apply for asylum, and unceremoniously ‘[threw them] back to the other side’ of the 
Line. The last words the policemen uttered were ‘if you try to come here [again], we 
will kill you…’ Despite this difficult situation, William and his fellow travellers drew 
on past experiences in attempts to resist state controls and refashion their futures. 
Even though I was injured, I started to jump. I jumped because there was 
sewage there, I had to jump over to the other side. [It was] night … and 
there was a small bush. When they throw us there, they disappeared. I 
told the other guys, you see, why did these police disappear? They would 
have stayed around to make sure that we are not [jumping back]…. 
Because they disappear, so this is a dangerous place…. I said, all of us, 
we should sleep, nobody move. This place, either it’s a minefield or there 
should be a military barracks a few metres away here. If we move, they 
will shoot us. And if they shoot us, we will be shot in the North. There it’s 
not their problem. They will make a report that maybe some people 
wanted to cross, then we shoot them. So we should not let ourselves be 
killed. We have to be careful. We slept. I said everybody have to stay the 
place he is, no movement…. And then after a few minutes, we hear some 
noise in the bushes. I said you see, these are military. This is the reason 
why those police, they disappeared. We have to stay, sleep until we relax 
a little bit, to see the next step. There was not another option but to come 
back. So we decided to come back… (Interview: August 2009). 
 
This Congolese man’s knowledge of human rights norms and legal systems gave him 
leverage in his encounter with the police. Moreover, his awareness of police 
behaviour subsequently proved crucial to his efforts to re-enter the Republic of 
Cyprus. Despite the implementation of such barriers to stall migration efforts, the 
agency of those making these journeys is key in understanding how and why people 
continue to enter countries in a clandestine manner. William’s persistence and his 
reliance on kinship networks ultimately proved successful.  
I said we should avoid the number four because they know that they throw 
four people. So if they see four people walking around, immediately they 
will come and catch us. We have to go either one by one, or two by two, 
or… Then the last decision was okay, you three you go, I stay…. So, they 
left. It was at night. This is around ten now, ten or eleven [p.m.] Then, I 
have to leave as well. So, I left slowly, slowly, I left and crossed this 
time…. I didn’t have anything on me, no money, nothing…. I was just 
going like this. Until I find one shop, which is 24 hours working. They 
have telephone. I was dusty, hungry and I didn’t have anything. So, I have 
to call my sister in Canada…. I get her, I say this is the situation. We were 
arrested by the police, beaten up like this, they throw us in the north…. 
I’m really tired, I don’t know what is going to happen to me. I wanted 
them to at least arrest me so I can get treatment and some food…. I don’t 
know. My sister was a little bit concerned… And she told me, okay, you 
have to go to one hotel and then from the hotel you call me, so I can pay, I 
can transfer the money directly from my account, my credit card to the 
hotel so they will deduct, they will take out their money. So this is what I 
do. I said, no, I should not stay in Nicosia because maybe these police are 
still looking for me. I went to Larnaca (Interview: August 2009). 
 
The agency described by migrants and refugees while crossing the sea and other 
borderzones could be characterized as ‘individual acts of desperation’ (Ellermann 
2010: 409). However, I contend that these acts can reflect more robust expressions of 
agency that subvert state migration controls and belie the security spectacle at the 
border. For example, the confessionary acts described above force the hand of the 
AFM and result in migrants’ disembarkation in Malta.  Having arrived in a transit or 
destination country, migrants continue to resist policies and practices such as 
immigration detention through protest and escape strategies, and to resist 
marginalisation in the host community through acts of political organisation and 
demands for rights both nationally but also at the EU level (Interviews: 2008-2014).11 
Migrants have also cooperated with lawyers and NGOs in order to legally contest 
state practices. Indeed, longer periods of settlement can allow for more organized 
forms of resistance to emerge. Such efforts are discussed further below and, in some 
instances, result in legal condemnations of state practices, such as mandatory 
immigration detention and ‘push backs’ at sea, and in a narrowing of the boundaries 
of the state of exception. 
 
4. Negotiating Rights inside EU Territory  
Migrants continue to make demands, negotiate their rights and interests, and 
demonstrate agency once they arrive within EU member states. Nasim, a young 
Palestinian man, never intended to come to Malta. The boat he travelled on from 
Egypt sank en route to Italy, and he and his brother spent five days in the sea 
watching many of their fellow travellers perish before a French captain rescued them. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In speaking to reporters and researchers about their experiences and grievances, migrants also 
demonstrate an agency that troubles their subjectification and subverts state narratives about them and 
their journeys. 
Dehydrated to the point of delirium, they nevertheless were registered and sent 
immediately to one of Malta’s detention facilities when they arrived on the island. 
Despite their traumatic experience and fragile state, Nasim and his brother both 
refused to be fingerprinted during the police registration process, aware that these 
fingerprints would follow them around Europe and would inhibit their settlement in 
Sweden where they had family and intended to travel (Interview: December 2014). 
 
Such examples of migrant agency have thus far been more central to the migration 
scholarship within the disciplines of sociology and anthropology (e.g. Anderson & 
Ruhs 2010; Bakewell 2010; Sigona 2012; Van Liempt & Doomernik 2006). However, 
in academic fields more concerned with macro dynamics, such as International 
Relations, individuals beyond powerful policymakers are rarely included in analyses. 
Even in the literature on migration governance, the agency of migrants is often 
ignored. Despite this, migrant agency and forms of migrant resistance to state 
practices, including hunger strikes, protests, and court cases, influence state and 
regional policies, as well as state relationships. For example, the plight of refugees in 
Greece prompted the European Court of Human Rights (2011) to rule against 
returning an Afghan asylum seeker to the country under the Dublin Convention in 
2011 (cf. ECJ 2011). In these instances, NGOs often act as intermediaries, 
championing migrant causes at the regional and international level. However, the 
lobbying successes of NGOs in Brussels are based on their first-hand knowledge of 
the situation ‘on the ground’, with migrant testimonials forming an indispensable part 
of their expertise and campaigns (Hoffmann 2013). 
 
In Malta, protests in immigration detention have led to the EU exerting pressure on 
Malta to improve detention centre conditions and to reconsider its mandatory 18-
month detention policy. The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
complied a report after their visit to Malta that specifically references protests held by 
detainees, as well as allegations of mistreatment (Council of Europe 2005). 
Subsequently, legal action taken by migrants resulted in the European Court of 
Human Rights (2013a; 2013b) condemning Malta’s detention policy as a ‘defective 
national system hindering human-rights protection’, and in particular violating the 
right to liberty, the right to an effective remedy, and the prohibition against inhuman 
and degrading treatment.12 These developments, alongside the long-awaited release of 
a national inquiry into the death of a detainee in 2012, prompted the government to 
announce that they will reduce the 18-month detention limit to six months (Dalli 
2014) and end the mandatory detention of asylum seekers (Interview: senior 
government official, 2014; Dalli 2015).13  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Similarly, the Court used migrant testimony and data collected by advocacy organizations to 
condemn Italy’s practice of returning migrants and refugees to Libya from the high sea, a practice that 
Malta supported (ECHR 2012). 
13 At the time of writing, the government has not implemented either of these reforms. If these reforms 
are implemented, the government will continue to automatically detain migrants who do not claim 
asylum. 
 
Lawyers involved in such cases at the national and regional levels note the centrality 
of migrant participation and testimony. Indeed, the difficulty in identifying migrants 
who has been returned to another country or detained, and in ensuring their 
participation and testimony, often over a long period of time, can thwart attempts to 
launch such cases. Tefarra, an Eritrean refugee, arrived in Malta in 2006 and was 
immediately put in detention for 12 months. He explained his shock at being 
imprisoned:  
I’ve been in prisons in a lot of places and… I can say that it was the worst 
prison I’ve seen. Because what makes it the worst for me is that was not 
my expectation. And in other countries, I was in prison because I break 
the rules, but in Malta I didn’t break any rules. The only crime I 
committed is just I asked for asylum… I can tell you that I was cut off 
from everything. I had no communication with family; I’ve no 
communication with other people who live on the outside. I was doing 
nothing, just eating, waking up, and just like that for months, doing 
nothing (Interview: April 2009).  
 
After his release, in May 2007, Tefarra lodged a cased with the national court with the 
aid of a lawyer from Jesuit Refugee Services. The case was still pending six years 
later in 2013 and was cited in the European Court of Human Rights (2013a) 
judgement that year as evidence of the lack of an effective remedy. At the time of 
writing, the case is still pending after 41 court sittings were deferred and a further 19 
were adjourned between 2007 and 2016 (Civil Court – Malta 2007). The length of 
such proceedings diminishes the ability of migrants and NGOs to pursue these cases. 
 
Migrant and refugee protests are less common in the Republic of Cyprus. This 
difference may be explained by several factors: having no mandatory detention 
policy, the Cypriot government does not detain large numbers of migrants in one 
place for extended periods of time. This, alongside the more sizeable presence of 
migrant labourers who are also vulnerable to losing their legal status, causes the 
migrant population to be more dispersed across the island. Moreover, there are much 
fewer NGOs working in the areas of asylum and migration than in Malta, and thus a 
more limited capacity for advocacy and for support of migrant resistance to state 
practices. Nevertheless, NGOs have made use of their relationships within the migrant 
population and the oversight provided by the EU in their work. For example, a local 
migrant advocacy organisation, KISA, filed complaints with the European 
Commission in response to the Cypriot Supreme Court decision to deny labour 
migrants access to residency under the Long-Term Residents Directive (Interview: 
Lawyer, KISA, July 2009; cf. KISA 2008). KISA and other groups, such as Amnesty 
International, have also highlighted the length and conditions of immigration 
detention prior to deportation, for which they rely on migrant and refugee testimonies 
(KISA 2011; Kosmopoulos 2011). Such reports and complaints create more 
monitoring of Cypriot migration practices and impinges upon the state’s relationships 
at the regional level.  
 
Nevertheless, migrant and NGO actions appear to be more influential in Malta than in 
Cyprus. Malta is more visible in the EU with regard to migration and asylum. Having 
emphasised its vulnerability in the face of the migration ‘crisis’ (Mainwaring 2014), 
Malta attracts more attention from regional actors and thus simultaneously constructs 
a larger, more visible platform for migrants, refugees, and NGOs. We can conclude 
from this difference that migrant and refugee action can affect a state’s image, power, 
and relationships to varying degrees, depending on the levels of monitoring and 
oversight by non-governmental and supranational actors. NGOs play a crucial role in 
these feedback loops, as their advocacy work is often the most powerful tool available 
to marginalised migrants and refugees, especially at the regional and international 
level.  
 
Although the discussion above demonstrates migrants’ room for manoeuvre and 
ability to effect change, it is important to note that migrant agency and the 
contestation of the politics of mobility may be co-opted by the state. For example, 
Malta, and to a lesser extent Cyprus, have exploited the circumvention of their border 
policies by migrants and refugees in order to argue that the islands face a 
disproportionate responsibility for migration and asylum within the EU. Within this 
discourse, the inability of the state to secure borders and its vulnerability in the face of 
large, unregulated flows is emphasized and exploited for political gain. Thus an 
ambivalent relationship between the state and unauthorized migration arises: although 
the focus is on deterring the arrivals of these migrants and refugees, it is these very 
arrivals that have put Malta especially on the political map within the EU during the 
last decade. In this manner, the agency demonstrated by migrants and refugees in 
order to arrive on the island constitutes in part the power that Malta wields within the 
EU (Mainwaring 2014). 
 
5. Conclusion 
It would be understandable to examine the tragic and avoidable drowning of so many 
people in the Mediterranean in recent years and conclude that this borderzone, like so 
many others, is a landscape of fear and death (Nevins 2002: 120). However, I contend 
that this watery landscape is also one of negotiation and that foreclosing the notion of 
migrant agency allows states to depict these travellers in the extreme: as ever-
menacing security concerns, or as flotsam and jetsam pushed and pulled by powerful 
forces – smugglers, poverty, war, and so on. Both of these interpretations reinforce a 
focus on deterrence rather than rights or integration. Furthermore, the latter depiction 
of migrants-as-victims reinforces state narratives that migrants arrive in states 
‘accidently’, that they do not wish to remain, or that they belong and are safer at 
‘home’.  
 
The state narrative also dehumanizes the migrant, as it portrays her journey as an act 
into which she is coerced entirely by a smuggler and which she takes only out of 
desperation. This depiction and the poor understanding of the journey leads to 
erroneous policy assumptions and alienates host populations who cannot comprehend 
the risks migrants take in crossing seas, deserts, and other terrain. For example, an 
Eritrean refugee explained his marginalization in Malta in part due to the lack of 
understanding of his motivations and agency in crossing the Sea, which he believed 
lead Maltese people to think he and other migrants did not care for their own lives and 
were ‘crazy’ (Interview, April 2009). Similarly, another migrant said, ‘Because we 
come on the small boats on top of the big sea, so they are afraid. What kind of people, 
imagine…’ (Interview, April 2009). Reduced to uni-dimensional bare lives, it is 
inconceivable that these individuals have preferences, desires, long-term plans, and 
agency that shape their decision-making.  
 
Migrant agency qualifies the depiction of the border or borderzone as a state of 
exception. It reveals the room for manoeuvre available to migrants, the contested 
politics of mobility, and the limits of state power. This room for manoeuvre, where 
migrants are sometimes able to negotiate for their own interests, does not make them 
scheming villains or rational actors who exploit any opportunity, and should not 
undermine their claims to international protection. Although migrants may be legally 
and socially marginalised by a state, they are not absent from these interstate 
relations. Politically, they are marginalised both at the national and regional levels. 
Individually, they may be weak actors who are often overlooked in International 
Relations and other scholarship. However, drawing on the experiences of migrants a 
different picture emerges: at the micro level, they negotiate their mobility and contest 
migration controls, sometimes circumventing or even subverting them; in the 
aggregate, these flows of people are politically powerful. Indeed, it is their very 
marginalisation within a state that prompts migrants to resist state practice, inciting 
protests and riots. Although the effects may not be felt immediately, these acts can 
carry broader political consequences. 
 
It is only by looking to people who defy state controls by overstaying or by entering a 
state without authorisation that we begin to deconstruct state discourse of migration 
control and to appreciate the permeability of ‘Fortress Europe’. Despite the discursive 
and material machinery that is mobilised to limit unauthorized migration, migrants 
continue to employ strategies to resist migration controls. Indeed, the intensification 
of border enforcement is often met with a growing sophistication and 
professionalization of border crossing strategies and practices. In this sense, border 
controls not only encourage longer and more dangerous migrant journeys, but also 
higher levels of ingenuity and agency from migrants and smugglers. Nevertheless, 
migrant agency is still greatly circumscribed by the political power of the state and 
may be harnessed or even exploited by the state for its own purposes, as has been 
illustrated above. 
 
Constructing migrants as victims or villains ignores how states create vulnerability 
through immigration controls, and disregards the agency of migrants negotiated at the 
margins. The very fact that migrants have arrived in Malta, Cyprus, and elsewhere in 
a clandestine manner and settled in these countries speaks to their agency. 
Notwithstanding the fact that they are often marginalised and discriminated against, 
migrants’ long-term presence on the islands is not due to policy design. In this albeit 
limited sense, their agency has proved more powerful than that of the state. 
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